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ABSTRACT
A large literature has documented a significant increase in the difference between the wage of college
graduates and high school graduates over the past 30 years. I show that from 1980 to 2000, college
graduates have experienced relatively larger increases in cost of living, because they have increasingly
concentrated in metropolitan areas that are characterized by a high cost of housing. When I deflate
nominal wages using a location-specific CPI, I find that the difference between the wage of college
graduates and high school graduates is lower in real terms than in nominal terms and has grown less.
At least 22% of the documented increase in college premium is accounted for by spatial differences
in the cost of living. The implications of this finding for changes in well-being inequality depend on
why college graduates sort into expensive cities. Using a simple general equilibrium model of the
labor and housing markets, I consider two alternative explanations. First, it is possible that the relative
supply of college graduates increases in expensive cities because college graduates are increasingly
attracted by amenities located in those cities. In this case, the higher cost of housing reflects consumption
of desirable local amenities, and there may still be a significant increase in well-being inequality even
if the increase in real wage inequality is limited. Alternatively, it is possible that the relative demand
for college graduates increases in expensive cities due to shifts in the relative productivity of skilled
labor. In this case, the relative increase in skilled workers’ standard of living is offset by the higher
cost of living. The evidence indicates that changes in the geographical location of different skill groups
are mostly driven by changes in their relative demand. I conclude that the increase in well-being disparities
between 1980 and 2000 is smaller than the increase in nominal wage disparities that has been the focus
of the previous literature.
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One of the most important development in the US labor market over the past 30 years
has been a signiﬁcant increase in wage inequality. For example, the diﬀerence between the
wage of skilled and unskilled workers has increased signiﬁcantly since 1980. The existing
literature has focused on three classes of explanations: an increase in the relative demand
for skills caused, for example, by skill biased technical change; a slowdown in the growth
of the relative supply of skilled workers; and the erosion of labor market institutions that
protect low-wage workers.1
In this paper, I re-examine how inequality is measured and how it is interpreted. I
begin by noting that skilled and unskilled workers are not distributed uniformly across cities
within the US, and I assess how existing estimates of inequality change when diﬀerences in
the cost of living across locations are taken into account. I then discuss how to interpret
these measures of real wage inequality when changes in amenities are diﬀerent across cities.
I focus on changes between 1980 and 2000 in the diﬀerence in the average hourly wage for
workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more. Using Census data, I
show that from 1980 to 2000 college graduates have increasingly concentrated in metropolitan
areas with a high cost of housing. This is due both to the fact that college graduates in 1980
are overrepresented in cities that experience large increases in housing costs and to the fact
that much of the growth in the number of college graduates has occurred in cities with initial
high housing costs. College graduates are therefore increasingly exposed to a high cost of
living and the relative increase in their real wage may be smaller than the relative increase
in their nominal wage.
To measure the wage diﬀerence between college graduates and high school graduates
in real terms, I deﬂate nominal wages using a cost of living index that allows for price
diﬀerences across metropolitan areas. I closely follow the methodology that the Bureau
of Labor Statistics uses to build the oﬃcial CPI, while allowing for changes in the cost of
housing to vary across metropolitan areas. Since housing is by far the largest item in the
CPI—accounting for more than a third of the index—geographical diﬀerences in housing
costs have the potential to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the local CPI. In some speciﬁcations, I also
allow for local variation in non-housing prices.
The results are striking. First, I ﬁnd that between 1980 and 2000, the cost of housing
for college graduates grows much faster than cost of housing for high school graduates.
Speciﬁcally, in 1980 the diﬀerence in the average cost of housing between college and high
school graduates is only 4%. This diﬀerence grows to 14% in 2000, or more than three times
the 1980 diﬀerence. Second, consistent with what is documented by the previous literature,
I ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the nominal wage of high school and college graduates has
increased 20 percentage points between 1980 and 2000. However, the diﬀerence between the
real wage of high school and college graduates has increased signiﬁcantly less. Changes in the
1A comprehensive survey is found in Katz and Autor (1999).
1cost of living experienced by high school and college graduates account for about a quarter
of the increase in the nominal college premium over the 1980-2000 period. This ﬁnding does
not appear to be driven by diﬀerent trends in relative worker ability or housing quality and
is robust to a number of alternative speciﬁcations. Third, the diﬀerence between the wage of
college graduates and high school graduates is smaller in real terms than in nominal terms
for each year. For example, in 2000 the diﬀerence is 60% in nominal terms and 51% in real
terms.
Overall, the diﬀerence in the real wage between skilled and unskilled workers is smaller
than the nominal diﬀerence and has grown less.2 Does this ﬁnding mean that the signiﬁcant
increases in wage disparities that have been documented by the previous literature over the
last 30 years have failed to translate into signiﬁcant increases in disparities in well-being?
Not necessarily. Since local amenities diﬀer signiﬁcantly across cities, changes in real wages
do not necessarily equal changes in well-being.
To understand the implications of my empirical ﬁndings for well-being inequality, I use a
simple general equilibrium model of the housing and labor markets with two types of labor,
skilled and unskilled.3 The model indicates that the implications of my empirical ﬁndings for
well-being inequality crucially depend on why college graduates tend to sort into expensive
metropolitan areas. I consider two possible explanations. First, it is possible that college
graduates move to expensive cities because ﬁrms in those cities experience an increase in
the relative demand for skilled workers. This increase can be due to localized skill-biased
technical change or positive shocks to the product demand for skill intensive industries
that are predominantly located in expensive cities (for example, high tech and ﬁnance are
mostly located in expensive coastal cities). If college graduates increasingly concentrate in
expensive cities such as San Francisco and New York because the jobs for college graduates
are increasingly concentrated in those cities—and not because they particularly like living
in San Francisco and New York—then the increase in their utility level is smaller than the
increase in their nominal wage. In this scenario, the increase in well-being inequality is
smaller than the increase in nominal wage inequality because of the higher costs of living
faced by college graduates.
Alternatively, it is possible that college graduates move to expensive cities because the
relative supply of skilled workers increases in those cities. This may be due, for example, to
an increase in the local amenities that attract college graduates. In this scenario, increases in
the cost of living in these cities reﬂect the increased attractiveness of the cities and represent
the price to pay for the consumption of desirable amenities. This consumption arguably
2It is worth stressing that changes in cost of living, while clearly important, account only for a fraction
of the overall increase in wage inequality in this period.
3The model clariﬁes what happens to employment, wages, costs of housing of skilled and unskilled workers
and when a local economy experiences a shock to the productivity of skilled labor or a change in local
amenities. Unlike Roback (1982), productivity and amenity shocks are not necessarily fully capitalized into
land prices. This allows shocks to the relative demand and relative supply of skilled workers in a city to have
diﬀerent eﬀects on the well-being of skilled and unskilled workers and landowners.
2generates utility. If college graduates move to expensive cities like San Francisco and New
York because they want to enjoy the local amenities—and not primarily because of labor
demand—then there may still be a signiﬁcant increase in utility inequality even if the increase
in real wage inequality is limited.4 Of course, the two scenarios are not mutually exclusive,
since in practice it is possible that both relative demand and supply shift at the same time.
To determine whether relative demand or relative supply shocks are more important in
practice, I analyze the empirical relationship between changes in the college premium and
changes in the share of college graduates across metropolitan areas. My model indicates
that under the relative demand hypothesis, one should see a positive equilibrium relation-
ship between changes in the college premium and changes in the college share. Intuitively,
increases in the relative demand of college graduates in a city should result in increases in
their relative wage there. Under the relative supply hypothesis, one should not see such a
positive relationship. This test is related to the test proposed by Katz and Murphy (1992)
to understand nationwide changes in inequality.
Consistent with relative demand shocks playing an important role, I ﬁnd a strong positive
association between changes in the college premium and changes in the college share. While
this suggests that demand factors are important, it does not necessarily rule out supply
factors. As a second piece of evidence, I present instrumental variable estimates of the
relationship between changes in the college premium and changes in the college share based
on a shift-share instrument.5 The IV estimate establishes what happens to the college
premium in a city when the city experiences an increase in the number of college graduates
that is driven purely by an increase in the relative demand for college graduates. By contrast,
the OLS estimate establishes what happens to the college premium in a city when the city
experiences an increase in the number of college graduates that may be driven by either
demand or supply shocks. The comparison of the two estimates is therefore informative
about the relative importance of demand and supply shocks.
Overall, the empirical evidence is more consistent with the notion that relative demand
shocks are the main force driving changes in the number of skilled workers across metropoli-
tan areas. If this is true, it implies that the increase in well-being inequality between 1980
and 2000 is smaller than the increase in nominal wage inequality.
My ﬁndings are consistent with previous studies that identify shifts in labor demand—
whether due to skill-biased technical change or product demand shifts across industries with
diﬀerent skill intensities—as an important determinant of the increase in wage inequality
(for example, Katz and Murphy, 1992). But unlike the previous literature, my ﬁndings point
to an important role for the local component of these demand shifts. While in this paper I
take these local demand shifts as exogenous, future research should investigate the economic
4See also Kahn (1999).
5The instrument is a weighted average of nationwide relative skilled employment growth by industry, with
weights reﬂecting the city-speciﬁc employment share in those industries in 1980.
3forces that make skilled workers more productive in some parts of the country.6 The notion
that demand shocks are important determinants of population shifts is consistent with the
evidence in Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Bound and Holzer (2000).7 The speciﬁc ﬁnding
that variation in the college share is mostly driven by demand factors is consistent with the
argument made by Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008).
My results are also related to a series of papers by Pendakur (1998, 2002) and Lewbel and
Pendakur (forthcoming) on the correct use of price indexes on the measurement of inequality.
My approach is related to a paper by Black et al. (2010) which, along with earlier work by
Dahl (2002), criticizes the standard practice of treating the returns to education as uniform
across locations. They show that, in theory, the return to schooling is constant across
locations only in the special case of homothetic preferences, and argue that the returns
to education are empirically lower in high-amenity locations.8 My ﬁndings complement
the literature on consumption inequality, which has documented that income inequality is
higher and has grown faster than consumption inequality in many countries, including the
US. See Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, Violante (2010) for a recent review of the evidence. In
principle, my estimates have the potential to provide an explanation for the slower increase
in consumption inequality in this period.9
From the methodological point of view, this paper illustrates the importance of accounting
for general equilibrium eﬀects when thinking about the eﬀects of group speciﬁc labor market
shocks. Labor economists often approach the analysis of labor market shocks using a partial
equilibrium analysis. However, this paper shows that a partial equilibrium analysis can miss
important parts of the picture, since the endogenous reaction of factor prices and quantities
can signiﬁcantly alter the ultimate eﬀects of a shock. Because aggregate shocks to the labor
market are rarely geographically uniform, the geographic reallocation of factors and local
price adjustments are empirically important. It is diﬃcult to fully understand aggregate
labor market changes—like changes in relative wages— if ignoring the spatial dimension of
labor markets. This paper shows that labor ﬂows across localities and changes in local prices
have the potential to undo some of the direct eﬀects of labor market shocks and this may
alter the implications for policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe how the oﬃcial CPI
is calculated by the BLS and I propose two alternative CPI’s that allow for geographical
6See for example Moretti (2004a and 2004b) and Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (forthcoming).
7Chen and Rosenthal (forthcoming) document that jobs are the key determinant of mobility of young
individuals. Mobility of older individuals seems more likely to be driven by amenities.
8In a related paper, Black et al. (2009) argue that estimates of the wage diﬀerences between blacks and
whites need to account for diﬀerences in the geographical location of diﬀerent racial groups and develop a
theoretical model to understand when estimates of black-white earnings gap can be used to infer welfare
diﬀerences.
9See also Broda and Romalis (2009) who document the distributional consequences of increased imports
from China; Gordon (2009) and Gordon and Dew-Becker (2005, 2007 and 2008); and Aguiar and Hurst
(2007a and 2007b) who focus on the role of diﬀerential changes in labor supply and leisure, by skill group.
4diﬀerences across skill groups. In Section 3, I present estimates of nominal and real college
premia. In Section 4, I present a simple model that can help interpreting the empirical
evidence. In Section 5, I discuss the diﬀerent implications of the demand pull and supply
push hypotheses and present empirical evidence to distinguish the two. Section 6 concludes.
2 Cost of Living Indexes and the Location of Skilled
and Unskilled Workers
In this Section, I begin with some descriptive evidence on recent changes in the geo-
graphical location of skilled and unskilled workers and housing costs (subsection 2.1). I then
describe how the Bureau of Labor Statistics computes the oﬃcial Consumer Price Index and
I propose two alternative measures of cost of living that account for geographical diﬀerences
(subsection 2.2). Finally, I use my measures of cost of living to document the diﬀerential
change in the cost of living experienced by high school and college graduates between 1980
and 2000 (subsection 2.3).
2.1 Changes in the Location of Skilled and Unskilled Workers
Throughout the paper, I use data from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses of Population.10
The geographical unit of analysis is the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) of residence.
Rural households in the Census are not assigned a MSA. In order to keep my wage regressions
as representative and as consistent with the previous literature as possible, I group workers
who live outside a MSA by state, and treat these groups as additional geographical units.
Table 1 documents diﬀerences in the fraction of college graduates across some US metropoli-
tan areas. Speciﬁcally, the top (bottom) panel reports the 10 cities with the highest (lowest)
fraction of workers with a college degree or more in 2000. Throughout the paper, college
graduates also include individuals with a post-graduate education. The metropolitan area
with the largest share of workers with a college degree among its residents is Stamford, CT,
where 58% of workers has a college degree or more. The fraction of college graduates in
Stamford is almost 5 times the fraction of college graduates in the city at the bottom on
the distribution—Danville, VA—where only 12% of workers have a college degree. Other
metropolitan areas in the top group include MSA’s with an industrial mix that is heavy in
high tech and R&D—such as San Jose, San Francisco, Boston and Raleigh-Durham—and
MSA’s with large universities— such as Ann Arbor, MI and Fort Collins, CO. Metropolitan
areas in the top panel have a higher cost of housing—as measured by the average monthly
rent for a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment—than metropolitan areas in the bottom panel. College
share and the cost of housing vary substantially not only in their levels across locations but
10Because my data end in 2000, my empirical analysis is not aﬀected by the run-up in home prices during
the housing bubble years and the subsequent decline in home prices.
5also in their changes over time. While cities like Stamford, Boston, San Jose and San Fran-
cisco experienced large increases in both the share of workers with a college degree and the
monthly rent between 1980 and 2000, cities in the bottom panel experienced more limited
increases.
The relation between changes in the number of college graduates and changes in housing
costs is shown more systematically in Figure 1. The top panel shows how the 1980-2000
change in the share of college graduates relates to the 1980 share of college graduates.
The positive relationship indicates that college graduates are increasingly concentrated in
metropolitan areas that have a large share of college graduates in 1980. This relationship
has been documented by Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Moretti (2004), among others.11
The middle panel of Figure 1 shows how the 1980-2000 change in the share of college
graduates relates to the average cost of housing in 1980. The positive relationship indicates
that college graduates are increasingly concentrated in MSA’s where housing is initially
expensive.12 The bottom panel plots the 1980-2000 change in college share as a function of
the 1980-2000 change in the average monthly rental price. The positive relationship suggests
that the share of college graduates has increased in MSA’s where housing has become more
expensive.13
These relationships do not have a causal interpretation, but instead need to be inter-
preted as equilibrium relationships. Taken together, the panels in Figure 1 show that the
metropolitan areas that have experienced the largest increases in the share of college grad-
uates are the metropolitan areas where the average cost of housing in 1980 is highest and
also the areas where the average cost of housing has increased the most.
2.2 Local Consumer Price Indexes
A cost of living index seeks to measure changes over time in the amount that consumers
need to spend to reach a certain utility level or “standard of living.” Changes in the oﬃcial
Consumer Price Index between period t and t + 1 as measured by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics are a weighted average of changes in the price of the goods in a representative
consumption basket. The basket is the original consumption basket at time t, and the
weights reﬂect the share of income that the average consumer spends on each good at time
11The regression of the 1980-2000 change in college share on the 1980 level in college share weighted by
the 1980 MSA size yields a coeﬃcient equal to .460 (.032), indicating that a 10 percentage point diﬀerence in
the baseline college share in 1980 is associated with a 4.6 percentage point increase in college share between
1980 and 2000.
12The regression of the 1980-2000 change in college share on the 1980 cost of housing weighted by the 1980
MSA size yields a coeﬃcient equal to .0011 (.00006), indicating that a 100 dollar diﬀerence in the baseline
monthly rent in 1980 is associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in college share between 1980 and
2000.
13The regression yields a coeﬃcient equal to .0003 (.00001).
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Table 2 shows the relative importance of the main aggregate components of the CPI-U
in 2000. The largest component by far is housing. In 2000, housing accounts for more than
42% of the CPI-U. The largest sub-components of housing costs are “Shelter” and “Fuel
and Utilities”. The second and third main components of the CPI-U are transportation and
food. They only account for 17.2% and 14.9% of the CPI-U, respectively. The weights of all
the other categories are 6% or smaller.
Although most households in the US are homeowners, changes in the price of housing
are measured by the BLS using changes in the cost of renting an apartment (Poole, Ptacek
and Verbugge, 2006; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). The rationale for using rental costs
instead of home prices is that rental costs are a better approximation of the user cost of hous-
ing. Since houses are an asset, their price reﬂects both the user cost as well as expectations
of future appreciation.
Rental costs vary signiﬁcantly across metropolitan areas. For example, in 2000, the
average rental cost for a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment in San Diego, CA—the city at the 90th
percentile of the distribution—is $894. This rental cost is almost 3 times higher than the
rental cost for an equally sized apartment in Decatour, AL, the city at the 10th percentile.
Changes over time in rental costs also vary signiﬁcantly across metropolitan areas. For
example, between 1980 and 2000, the rental cost increased by $165 in Johnstown, PA—one
of the cities at the bottom of the distribution—and by $892 in San Jose—one of the cities at
the top of the distribution. The distribution of average rental costs and changes in average
rental costs are shown in Figure 2.
Although the cost of living varies substantially across metropolitan areas, wage and in-
come are typically deﬂated using a single, nation-wide deﬂator, such as the CPI-U calculated
by the BLS. The use a nation-wide deﬂator is particularly striking in light of the fact that
more than 40% of the CPI-U is driven by housing costs (Table 2), and that housing costs vary
so much across locations (Figure 2). To investigate the role of cost of living diﬀerences on
wage diﬀerences between skill groups, I propose two alternative CPI indexes that vary across
metropolitan areas. I closely follow the methodology that the Bureau of Labor Statistics
uses to build the oﬃcial Consumer Price Index, but I generalize two of its assumptions.
Local CPI 1. First, I compute a CPI that allows for the fact that the cost of housing
varies across metropolitan areas. I call the resulting local price index “Local CPI 1”. Fol-
lowing the BLS methodology, I deﬁne Local CPI 1 as the properly weighted sum of local
cost of housing—with the average across cities normalized to 1 in 1980—and non-housing
14One well known problem with the CPI is the potential for substitution bias, which is the possibility that
consumers respond to price changes by substituting relatively cheaper goods for goods that have become
more expensive. While the actual consumption baskets may change, the CPI reports inﬂation for the original
basket. Details of the BLS methodology are described in Chapter 17 of the Handbook of Methods (BLS,
2007), titled “The Consumer Price Index”.
7consumption—normalized to 1 in 1980. I measure the cost of housing faced by an individual
in metropolitan area c in two ways. In my preferred speciﬁcation, I follow the BLS method-
ology and I use rental costs. I assign the cost of housing to residents in a metropolitan area
based on the relevant average monthly rent. Speciﬁcally, I take the average of the monthly
cost of renting a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment among all renters in area c. As an alternative
way to measure cost of housing, in some models I use the price of owner occupied houses
instead of rental costs. Speciﬁcally, I take the average reported value of all 2 or 3 bedroom
owner occupied single family houses in area c. Both rental costs and housing prices are from
the Census of Population. As I discuss later, empirical results are not sensitive to measur-
ing housing costs using rental costs or housing prices. The price of non housing goods and
services is assumed to be the same in a given year, irrespective of location. This assumption
is relaxed in Local CPI 2.
I describe the details of this approach in Appendix 1. It is important to note that this
methodology ensures that the deﬂator that I use for a given worker does not reﬂect the
increase in the cost of the apartment rented or the cost of the house owned by that speciﬁc
worker. Instead, it reﬂects the increase in the cost of housing experienced by residents in
the same city, irrespective of their own individual housing cost and irrespective of whether
they rent or own.
Local CPI 2. In local CPI 1, changes in the cost of housing can vary across localities,
but changes in the cost of non-housing goods and services are assumed to be the same
everywhere. While the cost of housing is the most important component of the CPI, the
price of other goods and services is likely to vary systematically with the cost of housing.
In cities where land is more expensive, production and retail costs are higher and therefore
the cost of many goods and services is higher. For example, a slice of pizza or a hair cut are
likely to be more expensive in New York city than in Indianapolis, since it is more expensive
to operate a pizza restaurant or a barber shop in New York city than Indianapolis.
Local CPI 2 allows for both the cost of housing and the cost of non-housing consump-
tion to vary across metropolitan areas. Systematic, high quality, city-level data on the
price of non-housing good and services are not available for most cities over a long time
period. To overcome this limitation, I use two alternative approaches. First, in my pre-
ferred speciﬁcation, I use the fact that the BLS releases a local CPI for a limited number
of metropolitan areas. This local CPI is not ideal because of the 315 MSA’s in the 2000
Census, the metropolitan-level CPI is made available by the BLS only for 23 MSA’s in the
period under consideration. Additionally, it is normalized to 1 in a given year, thus preclud-
ing cross-sectional comparisons. However, it can still be used to impute the part of local
non-housing prices that varies systematically with housing costs. The local CPI computed
by the BLS for city c in year t is a weighted average of housing cost (HPct) and non-housing
costs (NHPct): BLSct = wHPct + (1 − w)NHPct where w is the CPI weight used by BLS for
8housing. Non-housing costs can be divided in two components:
NHPct = πHPct + vct (1)
where πHPct is the component of non-housing costs that varies systematically with housing
costs; and vct is the component that is orthogonal to housing costs. If π > 0 it means that
cities with higher cost of housing also have higher costs of non-housing goods and services.
I use the small sample of MSA’s for which a local BLS CPI is available to estimate π.15 I
then impute the systematic component of non-housing costs to all MSA’s, based on their
housing cost: E(NHPct|HPct) = ˆ πHPct. Finally, I compute “Local CPI 2” as a properly
weighted sum of the cost of housing, the component of non-housing costs that varies with
housing (ˆ πHPct), and the component of non-housing costs that does not vary with housing.
See Appendix 1 for more details.
As an alternative strategy to measure local variation in non-housing prices, I use data on
non-housing prices taken from the Accra dataset, which is collected by the Council for Com-
munity and Economic Research.16 The Accra data have both advantages and disadvantages.
On one hand, the Accra data are available for most cities, and therefore do not require any
imputation. Furthermore, the detail is such that price information is available at the level
of speciﬁc consumption goods and the price is not normalized to a base year. On the other
hand, the Accra data are available only for a very limited number of goods.17 Importantly,
the sample size for each good and city is quite small, so that local price averages are noisy.
Additionally, the set of cities covered changes over time. In practice, the empirical ﬁndings
based on the version of local CPI 2 that uses the imputation and those based on the version
of local CPI 2 that uses Accra data are similar.
In sum, local CPI 2 is more comprehensive than Local CPI 1 because it includes local
variation in both housing and non-housing costs, but it is has the limitation that non-housing
costs are imputed or come from Accra data. For this reason, in the next Section I present
separate estimates for Local CPI 1 and Local CPI 2.
2.3 Changes in the Cost of Living Experienced by Skilled and
Unskilled Workers Between 1980 and 2000
I now quantify the changes in the cost of living experienced by high school and college
graduates between 1980 and 2000. The top panel of Table 3 shows changes in the oﬃcial
15To do so, I ﬁrst regress changes in the BLS local index on changes in housing costs: ∆BLSct = β∆HPct+
ect. Estimating this regression in diﬀerences is necessary because BLSct is normalized to 1 in a given year.
While cross-sectional comparisons based on BLSct are meaningless, BLSct does measure changes in prices
within a city. Once I have an estimate of β, I can calculate ˆ π =
ˆ β−w
1−w. Empirically, ˆ β is equal to .588 (.001)
and ˆ π is equal to .35 in 2000.
16The data were generously provided by Emek Basker. Basker (2005) and Basker and Noel (2007) describe
the Accra dataset in detail.
17Only 48 goods have prices that are consistently deﬁned for the entire period under consideration. The
BLS basket includes more than 1000 goods.
9CPI-U, as reported by the BLS, and normalized to 1 in 1980. This is the most widely used
measure of inﬂation, and it is the measure that is almost universally used to deﬂate wages
and incomes. According to this index, the price level doubled between 1980 and 2000. This
increase is—by construction—the same for college graduates and high school graduates.
The next panel shows the increase in the cost of housing faced by college graduates and
high school graduates. College graduates and high school graduates are exposed to very
diﬀerent increases in the cost of housing. In 1980 the cost of housing for the average college
graduate is only 4% more than the cost of housing for the average high school graduate.
This gap grows to 11% in 1990 and reaches 14% by 2000. Column 4 indicates that housing
costs for high school and college graduates increased between 1980 and 2000 by 127% and
147%, respectively.
The third panel shows “Local CPI 1”, normalized to 1 in 1980 for the average household.18
The panel shows that in 1980 the overall cost of living experienced by college graduates is
only 2% higher than the cost of living experienced by high school graduates. This diﬀerence
increases to 6% by year 2000. The diﬀerence in Local CPI 1 between high school and college
graduates is less pronounced than the diﬀerence in monthly rent because Local CPI 1 includes
non-housing costs as well as housing costs.
The diﬀerential increase in cost of living faced by college graduates relative to high school
graduates is more pronounced when the price of non-housing goods and services is allowed
to vary across locations, as in the bottom panel. In the case of Local CPI 2, the cost of
living is 3% higher for college graduates relative to high school graduates in 1980 and 9%
in 2000. Column 4 indicates that the increase in the overall price level experienced by high
school graduates between 1980 and 2000 is 108%. The increase in the overall price level
experienced by college graduates between 1980 and 2000 is 119%.
The relative increase in the cost of housing experienced by college graduates between
1980 and 2000 can be decomposed into a part due to geographical mobility and a part due
to the fact that already in 1980 college graduates are overrepresented in cities that experience
large increases in costs. Speciﬁcally, the 1980-2000 nationwide change in the cost of housing
experienced by skill group j (j=high school or college), can be written as






c(ωjc2000 − ωjc1980)Pc2000 +
P
c ωjc1980(Pc2000 − Pc1980)
where ωjct is the share of workers in skill group j who live in city c in year t and Pct
is the cost of housing in city c in year t. The equation illustrates that the total change
in cost of housing is the sum of two components: a part due to the the change in the
share of workers in each city, given 2000 prices (
P
c(ωjc2000 − ωjc1980)Pc2000); and a part due
to the diﬀerential change in the cost of housing across cities, given the 1980 geographical
distribution (
P
c ωjc1980(Pc2000 − Pc1980)). The change in cost of housing of college graduates
18Here I use rental costs to measure housing costs. Using property values for owner occupied houses yields
similar results.
10relative to high school graduates is therefore the diﬀerence of these two components for
college graduates and high school graduates.
Empirically, I ﬁnd that both factors are important. About 43% of the total increase
in cost of housing of college graduates relative to high school graduates is due to the ﬁrst
component (geographical mobility of college graduates toward expensive cities), and 57% is
due to the second component (larger cost increase in cities that have many college graduates
in 1980).
3 Nominal and Real Wage Diﬀerences
In this Section, I estimate how much of the increase in nominal wage diﬀerences between
college graduates and high school graduates is accounted for by diﬀerences in the cost of
living. In particular, in Section 3.1 I show estimates of the college premium in nominal and
real terms. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 I discuss whether my estimates are biased by the presence
of unobserved worker characteristics or unobserved housing characteristics. In Section 3.4 I
show estimates of the college premium in real terms based on an alternative local CPI that
varies not just by metropolitan area, but also by skill level within metropolitan area.
3.1 Main Estimates
Model 1 in the top panel of Table 4 estimates the conditional nominal wage diﬀerence
between workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more, by year. Esti-
mates in columns 1 to 4 are from a regression of the log nominal hourly wage on an indicator
for college interacted with an indicator for year 1980, an indicator for college interacted
with an indicator for year 1990, an indicator for college interacted with an indicator for year
2000, years dummies, a cubic in potential experience, and dummies for gender and race.
Estimates in columns 5 to 8 are from models that also include MSA ﬁxed eﬀects. Entries
are the coeﬃcients on the interactions of college and year and represent the conditional wage
diﬀerence for the relevant year. The sample includes all US born wage and salary workers
aged 25-60 who have worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year.
My estimates in columns 1 to 4 indicate that the conditional nominal wage diﬀerence
between workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more has increased
signiﬁcantly. The diﬀerence is 40% in 1980 and rises to 60% by 2000. Column 4 indicates
that this increase amounts to 20 percentage points. This estimate is generally consistent
with the previous literature (see, for example, Table 3 in Katz and Autor, 1999).
Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 show the conditional real wage diﬀerences between workers
with a high school degree and workers with college or more. To quantify this diﬀerence, I
estimate models that are similar to Model 1, where the dependent variable is the nominal
wage divided by Local CPI 1 (in Model 2) or by Local CPI 2 (in Model 3). Two features are
noteworthy. First, the level of the conditional college premium is lower in real terms than
11in nominal terms in each year. For example, in 2000 the conditional diﬀerence between the
wage for college graduates and high school graduates is .60 in nominal terms and only .53 in
real terms when Local CPI 1 is used as deﬂator. The diﬀerence is smaller—.51 percentage
points—when Local CPI 2 is used as deﬂator. Second, the increase between 1980 and 2000
in college premium is signiﬁcantly smaller in real terms than in nominal terms. For example,
using Local CPI 1, the 1980-2000 increase in the conditional real wage diﬀerence between
college graduates and high school graduates is 15 percentage points. In other words, cost of
living diﬀerences as measured by Local CPI 1 account for 25% of the increase in conditional
inequality between college and high school graduates between 1980 and 2000 (column 4).
The eﬀect of cost of living diﬀerences is even more pronounced when the cost of living is
measured by Local CPI 2. In this case, the increase in the conditional real wage diﬀerence
between college graduates and high school graduates is 14 percentage points. This implies
that cost of living diﬀerences as measured by Local CPI 2 account for 30% of the increase
in conditional wage inequality between college and high school graduates between 1980 and
2000 (column 4).
When I control for ﬁxed eﬀects for metropolitan areas in columns 5-8, the nominal college
premium is slightly smaller, but the real college premium is generally similar. The increase
in the college premium is 18 percentage points when measured in nominal terms, and 14-15
percentage points when measured in real terms, depending on whether CPI 1 or CPI 2 is used
as deﬂator. After conditioning on MSA ﬁxed eﬀects, cost of living diﬀerences account 22%
of the increase in conditional inequality between college and high school graduates between
1980 and 2000 when CPI 2 is used as a deﬂator (column 8).
In Tables 5 and 6 I present the results from several alternative speciﬁcations. I begin in
the top panel of Table 5 by showing estimates where I deﬂate nominal wages based on local
CPI’s that measure housing costs using the average price of owner occupied houses instead of
average rental costs. In particular, as discussed in Section 2.2, I measure local housing prices
by taking the average reported property value of all 2 or 3 bedroom single family owner
occupied houses in the relevant MSA. In the second panel, I compute Local CPI 2 using the
Accra dataset described above to measure local variation in non-housing prices. (See Section
2.2 for details). In the third panel, I compute the Local CPI’s allowing for the expenditure
share of housing and non-housing goods to vary by metropolitan areas and skill level. (See
Appendix 1 for more details). In the bottom panel, I consider the possibility that commuting
distance may vary diﬀerentially for high school and college graduates. For example, it is
possible that increases in the number of college graduates in some cities lead high school
graduates to live farther away from job locations. To account for possible diﬀerential changes
in commuting times, I re-estimate the baseline model where the dependent variable is wage
per hour worked or spent commuting. In the baseline estimates, I calculate hourly wage by
taking the ratio of weekly or monthly earnings over the sum of number of hours worked. By
contrast, here I calculate hourly wage by taking the ratio of weekly or monthly earnings over
the sum of number of hours worked plus time spent commuting.
12In the top panel of Table 6, I show estimates based on a sample that includes all wage
and salary workers 25-60, irrespective of the number of weeks worked in the previous year. In
the middle panel, I show estimates that include workers born outside the US. In the bottom
panel I drop rural workers (i.e. those who are not assigned an MSA).
In general, estimates in Tables 5 and 6 are not very diﬀerent from the baseline estimates
in Table 4. The inclusion of workers with less than 48 weeks of work results in a slightly
larger percent of the nominal increase in inequality being accounted for by diﬀerences in cost
of living. I have performed several additional robustness checks that are not reported in the
Table due to space limitations and that are generally consistent with the estimates reported
in the Table.19
3.2 Worker Ability
One might be concerned about unobserved diﬀerences in worker ability. Models in Tables
4 and 5 control for standard demographics, but not for worker ability. Ability of college
graduates and high school graduates is likely to vary across metropolitan areas. Note that
what may cause bias is not the mere presence of cross-sectional diﬀerences across cities in
the relative average ability of college graduates and high school graduates. My estimates of
the change in college premium in real terms are biased if the change over time in the average
ability of college graduates relative to high school graduates in a given city is systematically
related to changes over time in cost of living in that city. The direction of the bias is a priori
not obvious. If the average unobserved ability of college graduates relative to high school
graduates grows more (less) in expensive cities compared to less expensive cities, then the
estimates of the real college premia in Table 4 are biased downward (upward).
While I can not completely rule out the possibility of unmeasured worker diﬀerences, in
Figure 3 I provide some evidence on the relationship between one measure of worker ability
and housing costs. Speciﬁcally, I use NLSY data to relate the diﬀerence in average AFQT
scores between college graduates and high-school graduates across metropolitan areas to the
cost of housing across metropolitan areas.20
The top panel in the Figure shows average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom apart-
19For example, when I allow for the eﬀect of experience, race, and gender to vary over time by controlling
for the interaction of year with gender, race and a cubic in experience, results are similar to Table 4. When
I estimate separate models for male and females, results are generally similar. When I estimate separate
models for workers with less than 20 years of experience and workers with more than 20 years of experience,
I ﬁnd that the college premium seems to be smaller, and to have grown less—both in nominal and real
terms—for workers with higher levels of potential experience. Estimates where the dependent variable is the
log of weekly or yearly earnings are also generally consistent with Table 4. Finally, my estimates are not
very sensitive to the exclusion of outliers (deﬁned as the top 1% and the bottom 1% of each year’s wage
distribution).
20My data contain AFQT score percentiles in 1980 and 1989. I merge these data with Census data on
housing costs for 1980 and 1990. Like in Section 3.1, housing costs are measured using the average cost of
renting a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment in the relevant MSA. I do not have AFQT scores in 2000.
13ment in 1980 on the x-axis against the diﬀerence between college graduates and high school
graduates in average AFQT score percentiles on the y-axis, across metropolitan areas. The
level of observation is a metropolitan area. The size of the bubbles reﬂects the size of the
metropolitan areas. Not surprisingly, the Figures shows that in most metropolitan areas
college graduates have signiﬁcantly higher average AFQT score than high school graduates.
However, this diﬀerence does not appear to be systematically associated with housing costs.
A weighted regression of the diﬀerence between college graduates and high school graduates
in average AFQT scores on the average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom apartment yields
a coeﬃcient equal to .0203 (.0274).
The bottom panel of the Figure shows the same relationship in changes over time. Specif-
ically, the graph shows the 1980-1990 change in average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom
apartment and the 1980-1990 change in the diﬀerence between college graduates and high
school graduates in average AFQT scores. A weighted regression yields a coeﬃcient equal
to .0010 (.0131).
In sum, the Figure indicates that both in a cross section of cities, as well as in changes
over time for the same city, diﬀerences in ability between skill groups are generally orthogonal
to housing costs.
3.3 Housing Quality
A second concern is the possibility that the the changes in housing costs faced by skilled
and unskilled workers reﬂect not just changes in cost of living, but also diﬀerential changes
in the quality of housing. This could bias my estimates of the relative increase in the cost
of living experienced by diﬀerent skill groups, although the direction of the bias is not a
priori obvious. One the one hand, the relative increase in the cost of housing experienced by
college graduates may be overestimated if apartments in cities with many college graduates
are subject to more quality improvements between 1980 and 2000 than apartments in cities
with many high school graduates. In this case part of the additional increase in the rental
cost in cities with many college graduates relative to cities with many high school graduates
reﬂects diﬀerential quality improvements. Take, for example, features like the presence of a
ﬁreplace, or quality of the kitchen and bathrooms. If these features have improved more in
cities with many college graduates, I may be overestimating the relative increase in cost of
living experienced by college graduates.
On the other hand, the relative increase in the cost of housing faced by college graduates
may be underestimated if apartments in cities with many high school graduates experience
more quality or size improvements. Take, for example, features like the size of an apart-
ment21, or the availability of a garden, a garage, or a porch. The average apartment in
New York or San Francisco is likely to be smaller than the average apartment in Houston or
21Although my measure of housing cost is the average rent for apartments with a ﬁxed number of bedrooms,
exact square footage may vary.
14Indianapolis and it is also less likely to have a garden, a garage or a porch. Moreover, these
features are less likely to have increased between 1980 and 2000 in New York or San Francisco
than in Houston or Indianapolis. Since the share of college graduates has increased more in
denser and more expensive cities, the true change in quality-adjusted per-square-foot price
faced by college graduates can in principle be larger than the one that I measure.
While I can not completely rule out the possibility of unmeasured quality diﬀerences,
here I present evidence based on a rich set of observable quality diﬀerences. I use data from
the American Housing Survey, which includes richer information on housing quality than
the Census of Population. Available quality variables include exact square footage, number
of rooms, number of bathrooms, indicators for the presence of a garage, a usable ﬁreplace, a
porch, a washer, a dryer, a dishwasher, outside water leaks, inside water leaks, open cracks
in walls, open cracks in ceilings, broken windows, presence of rodents, and a broken toilet in
the last 3 months.22
I begin by reproducing the baseline estimates that do not control for quality. Nominal
estimates based on the American Housing Survey in the top panel of Table 7 are generally
similar to the corresponding baseline estimates based on the Census reported in Table 4.23
These estimates indicate that the nominal college premium increases by 19 percentage points
between 1980 and 2000. In the middle panel I estimate the real college premium, without
controlling for housing quality. Finally, in the bottom panel I re-estimate the same model
holding constant all available measures of housing quality. As before, I measure housing
cost using the rental price for renters. But, unlike before, I ﬁrst regress housing costs on the
vector of observable housing characteristics. The residual from this regression represents the
component of the cost of housing that is orthogonal to my measures of dwelling quality. The
bottom panel of Table 7 shows how the baseline estimates change when I use the properly
renormalized residual as a measure of housing cost in my local CPI 1 and CPI 2. The
comparison of the middle and the bottom panels suggests that the 1980-2000 increase in real
college premium estimated controlling for quality is smaller than the corresponding increase
in the real college premium estimated without controlling for quality. Speciﬁcally, column
4 indicates that the increase in real college premium estimated controlling for quality is
15 percentage points. The corresponding estimate that does not control for quality is 16
percentage points.
In sum, though I can not completely rule out the possibility of unmeasured quality
diﬀerences, Table 7 indicates that controlling for a rich vector of observable quality diﬀerences
results in diﬀerences between nominal and real college premium that are slightly larger than
22Each year, the American Housing Survey has a sample size that is signiﬁcantly smaller than the sample
size in the Census. To increase precision, instead of taking only 1980, 1990 and 2000, I group years 1978-1984,
1988-1992 and 1998-2002 together.
23Unlike Table 4, the dependent variable here is log of yearly earnings. In the American Housing Survey
there is less information on number of hours worked than in the Census. Since college graduates work longer
hours, the estimated nominal college premium is slightly smaller than in Table 4.
15the baseline diﬀerences.
3.4 An Alternative Measures of Local Cost of Living
My estimates in Section 3.1 are based on a deﬁnition of cost of living where the housing
component of cost of living varies only by metropolitan area. In Appendix Table A1 I show
how my estimates change when an alternative deﬁnition of cost of living is adopted. In par-
ticular, I allow for the cost of housing experienced by diﬀerent individuals to vary depending
not just on their city of residence, but also on their education level, family structure and
race. The idea is that, within a city, not all households necessarily use the same type of
housing. Allowing for the cost of housing faced by diﬀerent demographic groups in a given
city to be diﬀerent may matter if tastes and budget constraints diﬀer across groups, so that
the type of housing that is used by some demographic groups in a city is not identical to the
one that is used by other groups. In this case, the group-speciﬁc rental cost is measured as
the predicted value from a regression of rental cost on identiﬁers for metropolitan area, edu-
cation group, number of children, race and interactions, where the regression is estimated on
the sample of renters of 2 or 3 bedroom apartments and the predicted values are calculated
for all households. Local CPI 3 only uses local variation in cost of living that arises from
variation in predicted cost of housing. Local CPI 4 uses local variation both in predicted
cost of housing and cost of non housing good and services. Estimates in Appendix Table 1
indicate that, relative to Table 4, a larger share of the increase in nominal wage diﬀerences
appears to be accounted for by cost of living diﬀerences.24
4 A Simple Framework
In the previous Section, I have shown that over the 1980-2000 period, real wage inequal-
ity has grown less than nominal wage inequality. Does this mean that the large increases
in nominal inequality have not translated into large increases in well being inequality? Not
necessarily. If amenities diﬀer across cities, changes in real wages do not necessarily equal
changes in well-being. In this Section, I use a simple general equilibrium model to inves-
tigate the implications of my empirical ﬁndings for changes in well-being disparities. The
implications are diﬀerent depending on the reasons for the increase in the share of college
graduates in expensive cities. I consider two alternative explanations for such an increase.
1. First, it is possible that skilled workers move to expensive cities because the relative demand
of skilled labor increases in expensive cities, as ﬁrms located in these cities increasingly
seek to hire skilled labor. This can be due to localized skill-biased technical change
24An obvious concern is the possibility of diﬀerential changes in the unmeasured quality of housing for
college graduates and high school graduates within a city. I have repeated the analysis of Table 7 and found
results that are generally similar.
16or positive shocks to the demand faced by industries that employ skilled workers and
are located in expensive cities (for example, high tech, ﬁnance, etc.). In this case, the
increase in utility disparity between skilled and unskilled workers is smaller than the
increase in nominal wage disparity, because the higher nominal wage of skilled workers
is in part oﬀ-sets by higher cost of living in the cities where skilled jobs are located.
2. Alternatively, it is possible that skilled workers move to expensive cities because the
relative supply of skilled labor increases in expensive cities, as skilled workers are in-
creasingly attracted by amenities located in those cities. In this case, a higher cost
of housing reﬂects consumption of desirable local amenities. Since this consumption
arguably generates utility, it is possible to have large increases in utility disparities
even when increases in real wage disparities are limited.
To formalize these two alternative hypotheses, and what they imply for inequality in
utility and wages, I consider a simple general equilibrium model of the labor and housing
market. The model is a generalization of the Roback (1982) model and has two types of
workers, skilled workers (type H) and unskilled workers (type L). Like in Roback, workers
and ﬁrms are mobile and choose the location that maximizes utility or proﬁts. But unlike
Roback, the elasticity of local labor supply is not inﬁnite, so that productivity and amenity
shocks are not always fully capitalized into land prices. This allows shocks to the relative
demand and relative supply of skilled workers to have diﬀerent eﬀects on the utility of skilled
and unskilled workers.
For simplicity of exposition, I model the two explanations as mutually exclusive. In the
empirical tests that seek to distinguish between the two explanations (Section 5), I allow for
the possibility that both demand and supply forces are at play at the same time.
4.1 Assumptions and Equilibrium
I assume that each city is a competitive economy that produces a single output good y
which is traded on the international market, so that its price is the same everywhere and set
equal to 1. Like in Roback, I abstract from labor supply decisions and I assume that each
worker provides one unit of labor, so that local labor supply is only determined by workers’
location decisions. The indirect utility of skilled workers in city c is assumed to be
UHic = wHc − rc + AHc + eHic (2)
where wHc is the nominal wage in the city; rc is the cost of housing; AHc is a measure
of local amenities. The random term eHic represents worker i idiosyncratic preferences for
location c. A larger eHic means that worker i is particularly attached to city c, holding
constant real wage and amenities. For example, being born in city c or having family in city
c may make city c more attractive to a worker. Similarly, the indirect utility of unskilled
workers is
17ULic = wLc − rc + ALc + eLic (3)
In equations 2 and 3, skilled and unskilled workers in a city compete for housing in the
same housing market and therefore face the same price of housing. This allows a shock to
one group to be transmitted to the other group through its eﬀect on housing prices.25 While
they have access to the same local amenities, diﬀerent skill groups do not need to value these
amenities equally: AHc and ALc represent the skill-speciﬁc value of local amenities.
Assume that there are two cities—Detroit (city a) and San Francisco (city b)—and a
ﬁxed number of workers is divided between the two cities. Tastes for location can vary by
skill group. Speciﬁcally, skilled workers’ and unskilled workers’ relative preferences for city
a over city b are, respectively
eHia − eHib ∼ U[−sH,sH] (4)
and
eLia − eLib ∼ U[−sL,sL] (5)
The parameters sH and sL characterize the importance of idiosyncratic preferences for
location and therefore the degree of labor mobility. If sH is large, for example, it means that
preferences for location are important for skilled workers and therefore their willingness to
move to arbitrage away real wage diﬀerences or amenity diﬀerences is limited. On the other
hand, if sH is small, preferences for location are not very important and therefore skilled
workers are more willing to move in response to diﬀerences in real wages or amenities. In
the extreme, if sH = 0 skilled workers’ mobility is perfect.
A worker chooses city a if and only if eia − eib > (wb − rb) − (wa − ra) + (Ab − Aa). In
equilibrium, the marginal worker needs to be indiﬀerent between living in Detroit and San
Francisco. This implies that skilled workers’ labor supply is upward sloping, with the slope
that depends on s. For example, the supply of skilled workers in San Francisco is:




where NHb is the log of the number of skilled workers hired in San Francisco and N =
NHa+NHb. If idiosyncratic preferences for location are not very important (sH is small), then
workers are very mobile and the supply curve is relatively ﬂat. If idiosyncratic preferences
for location are very important (sH is large), then workers are rather immobile and the
supply curve is relatively steep. Moreover, an increase is the real wage in Detroit, or an
improvement in the relative amenities shifts back the labor supply curve in San Francisco.26
25It is easy to relax this assumption by assuming some residential segregation by skill level within a city.
26An important diﬀerence between the Rosen-Roback setting and this setting is that in Rosen-Roback, all
workersare identical, and alwaysindiﬀerent across locations. In this setting, workersdiﬀer in their preferences
for location. While the marginal worker is indiﬀerent between locations, here there are inframarginal workers
who enjoy economic rents. These rents are larger the smaller the elasticity of local labor supply.
18For simplicity, I focus on the case where skilled and unskilled workers in the same city
work in diﬀerent ﬁrms. This amounts to assuming away imperfect substitution between
skilled and unskilled workers. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis, and it is not crucial
(Moretti, 2010). The production function for ﬁrms in city c that use skilled labor is Cobb-
Douglas with constant returns to scale: lnyHc = XHc + hNHc + (1 − h)KHc, where KHc is
the log of capital and XHc is a skill and city-speciﬁc productivity shifter. Firms are assumed
to be perfectly mobile. If ﬁrms are price takers and labor is paid its marginal product, labor
demand for skilled labor in city c is
wHc = XHc − (1 − h)NHc + (1 − h)KHc + lnh (7)
The labor market for unskilled workers is similar. I assume that there is an international
capital market, and that capital is inﬁnitely supplied at a given price i.27
Each worker consumes one unit of housing, so that demand for housing is determined by
the number of skilled and unskilled workers in a city. Speciﬁcally, the the local demand for
housing is the sum the demand of skilled workers and the demand of unskilled workers. For








sL(wHa − wHb − ra)
(sL + sH)
−
sH(wLa − wLb − ra)
(sL + sH)
(8)
To close the model, I assume that the supply of housing is
rc = z + kcNc (9)
where Nc = NHc + NLc is the number of housing units in city c, which is the same as the
number of workers. The parameter kc characterizes the elasticity of the supply of housing.
I assume that this parameter is exogenously determined by geography and local land reg-
ulations. In cities where geography and regulations make it is easy to build new housing,
kc is small. In the extreme case where there are no constraints to building new houses, the
supply curve is horizontal, and kc is zero. In cities where geography and regulations make
it diﬃcult to build new housing, kc is large. In the extreme case where it is impossible to
build new houses, the supply curve is vertical, and kc is inﬁnite.28
27In equilibrium demand for capital is equal to its supply and marginal product of capital is the same for
ﬁrms that use skill labor and those that use unskilled labor: XHc − hKHc + hNHc + ln(1 − h)= lniXLc −
hKLc + hNLc + ln(1 − h) = lni.
28A limitation of equation 9 is housing production does not involve the use of any local input. Roback
(1982) and Glaeser (2008), among others, discuss spatial equilibrium in the case where housing production
involves the use of local labor and other local inputs. Moreover, equation 9 ignores the durability of housing.
Glaeser and Gyourko (2001) point out that once built, the housing stock does not depreciate quickly and
this introduces an asymmetry between positive and negative demand shocks. In particular, when demand
declines, the quantity of housing cannot decline, at least in the short run.
19In period 1, the two cities are assumed to be identical. Equilibrium in the labor market
is obtained by equating equations 6 and 7 for each city. Equilibrium in the housing market
is obtained by equating equations 8 and 9. I consider two scenarios for period 2. In the ﬁrst
scenario, the relative demand of skilled workers increases in one of the two cities (Section
4.2). In the second scenario, the relative supply of skilled workers increases in one of the
two cities (Section 4.3). The implications of the two scenarios for the empirical analysis are
summarized in Section 4.4.
4.2 Increase in the Relative Demand of Skilled Labor
Here I consider the case where the productivity of skilled workers increases relative to
the productivity of unskilled workers in San Francisco. Nothing happens to the productivity
of unskilled workers in San Francisco and the productivity of skilled and unskilled workers
in Detroit. In other words, the relative demand for skilled labor increases in San Francisco.
The amenities in the two cities are identical and ﬁxed. Formally, I assume that in period
2, the productivity shifter for skilled workers in San Francisco is higher than in period 1:
XHb2 = XHb1 + ∆, where ∆ > 0 represents a positive, localized, skill-biased productivity
shock. I have added subscripts 1 and 2 to denote periods 1 and 2. The dot-com boom
experienced by the San Francisco Bay Area is arguably an example of such a localized skill
biased shock. Driven by the advent of the Internet and the agglomeration of high tech ﬁrms
in the area, the demand for skilled workers increased signiﬁcantly (relative to the demand
for unskilled workers) in San Francisco in the second half of the 1990s.29
Because skilled workers in San Francisco have become more productive, their nominal
wage increases by an amount ∆/h, proportional to the productivity increase. Attracted
by this higher productivity, some skilled workers leave Detroit and move to San Francisco.
Following this inﬂow of skilled workers, the cost of housing in San Francisco increases by
rb2 − rb1 =
sLNkb∆
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
≥ 0 (10)
In Detroit, the cost of housing declines by the same amount because of out-migration.
In San Francisco, real wages of skilled workers increase by
(wHb2 − rb2) − (wHb1 − rb1) =
kaNsH + kbNsH + kaNsL + 2sHsL
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≥ 0 (11)
It is easy to see that, because of the increased cost of housing, the increase in real wages
is smaller than the increase in nominal wages ∆/h. Moreover, this increase in the real wage
29Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008) argue that over the past 30 years, technological change resulted in
increases in the productivity of skilled workers in cities that already had many skilled workers. These cities
also happen to be cities with a higher than average initial share of college graduates and cost of housing.
See also Berry and Glaeser (2005).
20of skilled workers is larger the more elastic is housing supply in San Francisco (small kb).
Intuitively, a more elastic housing supply implies a smaller increase in housing prices in San
Francisco, and therefore a larger increase in real wage, for a given increase in nominal wage.
The increase in the real wage of skilled workers is also larger the smaller the elasticity of
local labor supply of skilled workers (large sH). Intuitively, lower elasticity of labor supply
implies less mobility. With less mobility, a larger fraction of the beneﬁt of the productivity
shocks is capitalized in real wages. In the extreme case of no mobility, (sH = ∞), the entire
productivity shock is capitalized in the real wage of skilled workers. The increase in the
real wage of skilled workers is larger the larger the elasticity of local labor supply of skilled
workers (small sL). A higher elasticity of labor supply of unskilled workers implies that a
larger number of unskilled workers move out in response to the inﬂow of skilled workers, so
that the increase in housing costs is more limited.
In Detroit nominal wages don’t change and housing costs decline, so that real wages for
skilled workers increase by
(wHa2 − ra2) − (wHa1 − ra1) =
sLkaN
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≥ 0 (12)
Although the shock has increased productivity only in one city, the equilibrium real
wages of skilled workers increase in both cities because of mobility. By comparing equation
11 with 12, it is easy to see that the increase in real wages in the city directly aﬀected by the
productivity shock (San Francisco) is larger than the increase in real wages in the city not
aﬀected by the productivity shock (Detroit): (wHb2 − rb2) − (wHb1 − rb1) ≥ (wHa2 − ra2) −
(wHa1 − ra1). This is not surprising. While labor mobility causes real wages to increase
in Detroit following a shock in San Francisco, real wages are not fully equalized because
mobility is not perfect and only the marginal worker is indiﬀerent between the two cities in
equilibrium. With perfect mobility (sH = 0), real wages are completely equalized.
What happens to the wage of unskilled workers? Because their productivity is ﬁxed,
their nominal wage does not change. However, housing costs increase in San Francisco and
decline in Detroit. As a consequence, the real wage of unskilled workers in San Francisco
decreases by
(wLb2 − rb2) − (wLb1 − rb1) = −
sLNkb
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≤ 0 (13)
Eﬀectively, unskilled workers compete for scarce housing with skilled workers, and the
inﬂow of new skilled workers in San Francisco hurts inframarginal unskilled workers through
higher housing costs. Marginal unskilled workers leave San Francisco, since their real wage
is higher in Detroit. Inframarginal unskilled workers (those who have a strong preference
for San Francisco over Detroit) opt to stay in San Francisco, even if their real wage is lower.
For the same reason, the real wage and utility of inframarginal unskilled workers in Detroit
increases:
21(wLa2 − ra2) − (wLa1 − ra1) =
sLNka
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≥ 0 (14)
The equilibrium number of skilled workers increases in San Francisco, while the equilib-
rium number of unskilled workers decreases. Changes in employment in Detroit are exactly
specular, by assumption. On net, the overall population of San Francisco increases because
the number of skilled workers who move in is larger than the number of unskilled workers
who leave.30
The productivity shock creates winners and losers. Skilled workers in both cities and
landowners in San Francisco beneﬁt from the productivity increase. Inframarginal unskilled
workers in San Francisco are negatively aﬀected, and inframarginal unskilled workers in
Detroit are positively aﬀected.31 The exact magnitude of the changes in utility for skilled and
unskilled workers and for landowners crucially depends on which of the three factors—skilled
labor, unskilled labor or land—is supplied more elastically at the local level. Speciﬁcally, the
incidence of the shock depends on the elasticities of labor supply of the two groups (which
are governed by the preference parameters sH and sL) and the elasticities of housing supply
in the two cities (which are governed by the parameters ka and kb). Moretti (forthcoming)
provides detailed discussion of the incidence and welfare consequences of relative demand
shocks.
The model also illustrates that a non-degenerate equilibrium is possible. After a shock
that makes one group more productive, both groups are still represented in both cities. This
conclusion hinges upon the assumption of a less than inﬁnite elasticity of local labor supply.32
Firms are indiﬀerent between cities because they make the same proﬁts in both cities. While
labor is now more expensive in San Francisco, it is also more productive there. Because ﬁrms
produce a good that is internationally traded, if skilled workers weren’t more productive,
30In particular, the number of skilled workers in San Francisco increases by
NHb2 − NHb1 =
∆N((ka + kb)N + 2sL)
2h(kaN(sH + sL) + kbN(sH + sL) + 2sHsL)
≥ 0 (15)
The number of unskilled workers declines by
NLb2 − NLb1 = −
N2(ka + kb)
2h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆ ≤ 0 (16)
San Francisco population increases by
(NHb2 + NLb2) − (NHb1 + NLb1) =
∆NsL
h(kaN(sH + sL) + kbN(sH + sL) + 2sHsL)
≥ 0 (17)
31Although inframarginal unskilled workers in San Francisco are made worse oﬀ by the decline in their real
wage, they are still better oﬀ in San Francisco than in Detroit because of their preference for San Francisco.
32In the absence of individual preferences for location, no unskilled worker would remain in San Francisco
and the equilibrium would be characterized by complete geographic segregation of workers by skill level.
This is not realistic, since in reality we never observe cities that are populated by workers of only one type.
22employers would leave San Francisco and relocate to Detroit.33
4.3 Increase in the Relative Supply of Skilled Labor
In the case of demand pull described above, the number of skilled workers in San Francisco
increases because the relative demand of skilled workers increases. I now turn to the opposite
case, where the number of skilled workers in San Francisco increases because the relative
supply of skilled workers in San Francisco increases.
Speciﬁcally, I consider what happens when San Francisco becomes relatively more desir-
able for skilled workers compared to Detroit. I assume that in period 2, the amenity level
increases for skilled workers in San Francisco: AHb2 = AHb1 + ∆′, where ∆′ > 0 represents
the improvement in the amenity. I assume that the productivity of both skilled and unskilled
workers, as well as the amenity level in Detroit, do not change.34
Unlike the case of demand, here the nominal wage of skilled workers in San Francisco and
Detroit remains unchanged.35 Attracted by the better amenity, some skilled workers move
from Detroit to San Francisco and some unskilled workers leave San Francisco to Detroit.36
On net, the population in San Francisco increases by
33An assumption of this model is that skilled and unskilled workers are employed by diﬀerent ﬁrms, so
that the labor market is segregated by skill within a city. This assumption eﬀectively rules out imperfect
substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor. In a more general setting, skilled and unskilled workers
work in the same ﬁrm. The qualitative results generalize, but the equilibrium depends on the degree of
imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. Speciﬁcally, complementarity between skilled
and unskilled workers implies that the marginal product of unskilled workers increases in the number of
skilled workers in the same ﬁrm. Thus, the inﬂow of skilled workers in city b caused by the increase in their
productivity endogenously raises the productivity of unskilled workers in city b. As a consequence, the real
wage of unskilled workers declines less than in the case described above. This mitigates the negative eﬀect
on the welfare of unskilled workers in city b and it reduces the number of unskilled workers who leave the
city.
34For simplicity, I have assumed that supply shocks are driven by increases in amenities for given tastes.
Glaeser and Tobio (2007) have a model that makes a similar assumption. Alternatively I could assume that
(i) amenities are ﬁxed, but the taste for those amenities increase; or (ii) both amenities and tastes are ﬁxed,
but amenities are a normal good so that college graduates consume more of them than high school graduates
(Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai, 2006).
35This may be surprising at ﬁrst. While one might expect wage increases in response to demand increases
(indeed, this is what happens in subsection 4.2), one might expect wage decreases in response to supply
increases. Why nominal wages do not decline in San Francisco? The reason is that in a model with capital,
nominal wages do not move in San Francisco because capital ﬂows to San Francisco and leaves Detroit,
oﬀsetting the changes in labor supply in the two cities. (In a model without capital nominal wages do
decline.)
36Speciﬁcally, the number of skilled workers who move to San Francisco is equal to
∆
′N((ka+kb)N+2sL)






23(NHb2 + NLb2) − (NHb1 + NLb1) =
∆′NsL
h(kaN(sH + sL) + kbN(sH + sL) + 2sHsL)
≥ 0 (18)
As a consequence, housing costs in San Francisco increase by
rb2 − rb1 =
sLNkb∆′
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
≥ 0 (19)
and decline in Detroit by
ra2 − ra1 = −
sLNka∆′
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
≤ 0 (20)
Real wages of skilled workers in San Francisco decline by an amount equal to equation
19 (with a minus sign in front). This reﬂects the compensating diﬀerential for the better
amenity in San Francisco. Real wages of skilled workers in Detroit increase by an amount
equal to equation 20 (with a minus sign in front).
Similarly, the real wage for unskilled workers in San Francisco declines by
(wLb2 − rb2) − (wLb1 − rb1) = −
sLNkb
h(kaNsH + 2sHsL + kaNsL + kbNsH + kbNsL)
∆
′ ≤ 0 (21)
and it increases in Detroit.
Like for the case of demand shocks, a supply shock generates winners and losers. Here
inframarginal skilled workers beneﬁt from the improvement in amenities. While the utility
gain is larger for inframarginal skilled workers in San Francisco, inframarginal skilled workers
in Detroit are also made better oﬀ, even if there is no change in amenity there. On the other
hand, inframarginal unskilled workers in San Francisco are made worse oﬀ by the increase
in housing prices. Similarly, inframarginal unskilled workers in Detroit are made better oﬀ
by the decline in local housing prices.
4.4 Implications for Inequality in Wages and Utility
The model has three implications that are useful in guiding the interpretation of the
empirical ﬁndings.
(A) First, the model clariﬁes the relationship between changes in relative wages and
changes in relative utility in the two scenarios. The analysis in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 suggests
that for a given nation-wide increase in the nominal wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers, the demand pull hypothesis implies a more limited increase in utility inequality,
while the supply push hypothesis implies a larger increase in utility inequality.
More speciﬁcally, in the demand pull scenario the nominal wage diﬀerence between skilled
and unskilled workers averaged across the two cities increases.37 The utility diﬀerence be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers averaged across the two cities also increases, but by an
37This average is a weighted average reﬂecting the size of the two cities.
24amount smaller than the increase in the nominal wage gap. It is possible to show that the
larger is the increase in housing costs experienced by skilled workers relative to unskilled
workers, the smaller is the increase in average utility experienced by skilled workers relative
to unskilled workers.38
The intuition is simple. The beneﬁts of a higher nominal wage for skilled workers are
in part eroded by the higher cost of housing in the cities where the new skilled jobs are
created. Thus, the relative utility of skilled workers does not increase as much as their
relative nominal wage. Put diﬀerently, if college graduates move to expensive cities like San
Francisco and New York because of increases in the relative demand for college graduates in
these cities—and not because they particularly like living in San Francisco and New York—
then part of the beneﬁt of higher nominal wage is oﬀset by the higher cost of living. In this
case, the increase in their real wage and utility level is smaller than the increase in their
nominal wage.
By contrast, in the supply push scenario, the utility diﬀerence between skilled and un-
skilled workers averaged across the two cities increases more than the nominal and real wage
diﬀerence between skilled and unskilled workers averaged across the two cities. Intuitively,
if college graduates move to expensive cities like San Francisco and New York because im-
provements in amenities raise the relative supply of college graduates there—and not because
of labor demand—then there may still be a signiﬁcant increase in utility inequality even if
the increase in real wage inequality is limited. In this case, increases in the cost of living in
these cities simply reﬂect the increased attractiveness of these cities to skilled workers and
38To formally see this, consider the population-weighted average across the two cities of the change in the
skilled-unskilled nominal wage diﬀerence and compare it with the population-weighted average across the
two cities of the change in the skilled-unskilled utility diﬀerence. In the simple case where ka = kb = k, the
diﬀerence between the two is
Nk∆2sL(sL + 2kN)
2h2(kNsH + sHsL + kNsL)2 ≥ 0 (22)
which is non-negative, indicating that the relative nominal wage of skilled workers grows more than their
relative utility. In the more general case where ka  = kb, the diﬀerence between the two remains positive as
long as the elasticity of housing supply in the city aﬀected by the demand shock is not too large compared
with the elasticity of housing supply in the city not directly aﬀected by the demand shock.
25represent the price to pay for the consumption of desirable amenities.39
(B) Second, the equilibrium described in subsections 4.2 and 4.3 suggests a simple em-
pirical test to distinguish between the two cases. If relative demand shifts are responsible for
the geographical reallocation of labor, we should see that in equilibrium, cities that experi-
ence large increases in the relative number of skilled workers (in the model: San Francisco)
also experience increases in the relative nominal wage of skilled workers, compared to cities
that experience small increases (or declines) in the relative number of skilled workers (in the
model: Detroit). By contrast, if relative supply shifts are responsible for the geographical
reallocation of labor, we should see that in equilibrium, cities that experience an increase in
the relative number of skilled workers experience no change in the relative nominal wage of
skilled workers.
One might have expected that an increase in the relative supply of factor of production
in a city should cause a decline in its equilibrium relative price. Why in the model the
nominal wage of skilled workers in San Francisco remains constant following an increase
in the relative supply of skilled workers? As discussed in Section 4.3, this is due to the
endogenous reaction of capital. Because capital is supplied with inﬁnite elasticity at a ﬁxed
interest rate, nominal wages do not move in San Francisco because capital ﬂows to San
Francisco and leaves Detroit, thus oﬀsetting the eﬀect of changes in labor supply in the two
cities. In a model without capital, nominal wages of skilled workers decline in San Francisco
following an increase in their supply.
(C) Finally, it is important to point out that, while the focus of the paper is on inequality
related to labor market outcomes, the broader welfare consequences of the demand and
supply shocks depend not just on changes in relative wages, but also on which of the two
education groups originally owns the land in the cities that beneﬁt from the demand and
supply shocks. In the model, some landowners beneﬁt from the demand and supply shocks
(namely those in San Francisco), while other are hurt (namely those in Detroit). The relevant
empirical question in this respect is which of the two skill groups owns more of the land in
the neighborhoods that whose land prices are raised by the inﬂow of new residents in cities
39To formally see this, note that the simple case where ka = kb = k, the population-weighted average
change in the skilled-unskilled nominal wage diﬀerence minus the population-weighted change in the skilled-
unskilled utility diﬀerence is equal to
−∆′(−kNsL∆′ + 2kNsHsL + 2kNsHsL + sHsL + sL∆′sH + k2N2s2
L + k2N2s2
H + k2N2sH∆′ + 2kNs2
HsL + 2Nk∆′sHsL
(2(kNsH + sHsL + kNsL)2)
(23)
which is non-positive unless the elasticity of local labor supply of skilled workers is too small compared
with the elasticity of local labor supply of unskilled workers. In the more general case where ka  = kb, the
expression is considerably more complicated, but the diﬀerence remains non-positive unless the elasticity of
local labor supply of skilled workers is too small.
26that experience positive skill-biased shocks and the neighborhoods that are abandoned by
the outﬂow of residents is cities that experience negative shocks. This is an important but
complicated question. A full empirical treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for future research.
5 Interpreting the Evidence: Demand Pull or Supply
Push?
I now present empirical evidence that seeks to determine whether relative demand or rel-
ative supply shifts—or a combination of the two—drive changes in the geographical location
of diﬀerent skill groups. The analysis in subsections 4.2 and 4.3 suggests that the demand
pull and the supply push hypotheses have similar predictions for equilibrium housing costs:
under both hypotheses, cities that experience large increases in the share of college graduates
should also experience large increases in housing costs.
But the demand pull and supply push hypotheses have diﬀerent predictions for wage
changes. Under the demand pull hypothesis, cities that experience large increases in the
share of college graduates should experience large increases in the equilibrium relative wage
of college graduates. By contrast, under the supply push hypothesis, there should be no
positive relationship between increases in the share of college graduates and changes in the
equilibrium relative nominal wages. (See Section 4.4, part B.) Intuitively, increases in the
relative demand of a factor of production in a city should result in increases in its equilibrium
relative price there. Increases in the relative supply of factor of production in a city can not
cause an increase in its equilibrium relative price. A similar idea is used in Katz and Murphy
(1992) to explain nationwide changes in relative wages.
It is important to highlight that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive since it
is possible that cities experience both demand and supply shocks. It is also possible that
relative demand shifts endogenously generate relative supply shifts, and vice versa. For
example, an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor in a city may result in an
increase in the number of college educated residents in that city and this in turns may result
in increases in the local amenities that are attractive to college graduates, such as good
schools, good theaters, good restaurants, etc. Alternatively, an increase in the supply of
skilled workers in a city may generate agglomeration spillovers that lead to increases in the
productivity of ﬁrms and workers in that city (Moretti 2004a, 2004b).
I present two pieces of empirical evidence. First, I look at the OLS relationship between
changes in the college share and changes in the college premium across US metropolitan areas.
The ﬁnding of a positive coeﬃcient indicates that relative demand shifts are important, but
does not rule out the existence of relative supply shifts. Second, to shed more light on
whether relative supply shifts are important, I use an instrumental variable strategy.
27(1) First, in Figure 4, I show the empirical relationship between the equilibrium college
share and the equilibrium college premium across US metropolitan areas, both in the 2000
cross-section and in changes between 1980 and 2000. Demand pull would predict a positive
slope, while supply push would predict zero slope. Note that that the relationship in the
Figure is not causal. Rather, it is an equilibrium relationship between relative number of
college graduates and their relative wage. This is in contrast with earlier work, including
my own, that seeks to establish the causal eﬀect of increases in college share on wages and
therefore estimate diﬀerent speciﬁcations.40
The Figure shows a positive association between the college share and the college pre-
mium across US metropolitan areas, both in levels as well as in changes. Columns 1 and 2
in Table 8 quantify the corresponding regression coeﬃcients. The level of observation is the
metropolitan area. The dependent variable is the city-speciﬁc college premium, deﬁned as
the city-speciﬁc diﬀerence in the log of hourly wage for college graduates and high school
graduates conditional on all the controls used in the regressions (a cubic in potential expe-
rience, year eﬀects, gender and race). Models are weighted by city size. The coeﬃcient for
the speciﬁcation in column 2 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant: .388 (.057).
This evidence is consistent with demand factors playing a signiﬁcant role in driving
variation in college share across cities. This conclusion is consistent with Berry and Glaeser
(2005), who argue that demand factors play a more important role than supply factors in
explaining the sorting of skilled workers across US metropolitan areas.
(2) The evidence in Figure 4 and Table 8 suggests that demand factors are important,
but does not rule out that supply factors are also present. As a second piece of evidence that
may shed more light on whether relative supply factors play any role in driving variation in
college share across cities, I use observable shocks to the relative demand of skilled labor as
an instrumental variable for college share.
This IV estimate isolates the eﬀect on the college premium of changes in the college share
that are driven exclusively by changes in relative demand. Put diﬀerently, the instrumental
variable estimate establishes what happens to the college premium in a city when the city
experiences an increase in the number of college graduates that is driven purely by an increase
in the relative demand for college graduates. By contrast, the OLS estimate above establishes
what happens to the college premium in a city when the city experiences an increase in the
40For example, in Moretti (2004), I try to establish the causal eﬀect of increases in college share on wages.
The econometric speciﬁcation adopted here diﬀers from the speciﬁcation there, because in Moretti (2004)
the econometric model seeks to control for shocks to the relative demand of skilled labor. To this end, I
include in the regressions as controls several variables in order to absorb changes in the relative demand
for college graduates. I also use instrumental variables to further control for relative demand shocks. By
contrast, in this paper, I engage in a completely diﬀerent exercise. I do not seek to hold constant demand
shocks. Instead, I am interested in establishing the role played by demand shocks in aﬀecting changes in
college share across cities. What I am measuring in Figure 4 and Table 8 is the relationship between the
wage gap and the college share, inclusive of any human capital spillover.
28number of college graduates that may be driven by either demand or supply shocks. The
comparison of the two estimates is therefore informative about the relative importance of
demand and supply shocks.
To isolate relative demand shocks, I use as an instrument the weighted average of na-
tionwide relative employment growth by industry, with weights reﬂecting the city-speciﬁc
employment share in those industries:
Change in Relative Demand in City c =
X
s
ηsc(∆EHs − ∆ELs) (24)
where ηsc is the share of jobs in industry s in city c in 1980; ∆EHs is the nationwide change
between 1980 and 2000 in the log of number of jobs for college graduates in industry s
(excluding city c); ∆ELs is a similar change for high school graduates. If relative employment
of skilled workers in a given industry increases (decreases) nationally, cities where that
industry employs a signiﬁcant share of the labor force will experience a positive (negative)
relative shock to the labor demand of skilled workers (Katz and Murphy, 1992).
The ﬁrst stage relationship between demand shocks and changes in college share is shown
graphically in Figure 5. The ﬁgure shows that in cities that experience an increase in
the relative demand of college graduates the share of college graduates increases and the
relationship appears fairly tight. The regression coeﬃcient is .42(.02), with R2 of .44. This
is interesting because it means that this measure of demand shocks alone accounts for almost
half of the variation in the geographical location of diﬀerent skill groups. Since there are
other demand shocks that are not captured by the instrument, this lends indirect support
to the notion that demand shocks play an important role.
The instrumental variable estimate, in column 3 of Table 8, is .371 (.106) and is re-
markably close to the OLS estimate. The similarity between the OLS and the IV estimates
suggests that the increase in the college premium in a city caused by a demand shock (IV
estimate in column 3) is not very diﬀerent from the empirical correlation between the college
share and the college premium that is observed in the data (OLS estimate in column 2).
In other words, most of the empirical correlation between the college share and the college
premium that is observed in the data seems to be driven by demand shocks.
(3) Discussion of the role of amenities. The key ﬁnding in this section is that most
of the changes over time in the geographical location of skilled workers relative to unskilled
workers are driven by changes in the relative demand for skilled labor, rather than changes
in its relative supply.
It is important to clarify what this ﬁnding implies for the role of amenities in worker
location decisions. My ﬁnding does not imply that amenities do not aﬀect worker location
decisions in general. Amenities are clearly an important determinant of where people decide
to live. Furthermore, my ﬁnding does not imply that amenities do not aﬀect location deci-
sions of skilled and unskilled workers diﬀerently. It is possible that the relative importance
of certain amenities (cultural amenities, school quality, crime, restaurants) is diﬀerent for
29diﬀerent skill groups. What my ﬁnding implies is that the change over time in the diﬀerence
between skilled and unskilled workers in relevant local amenities did not play an important
role in driving diﬀerential changes in the geographical location of skilled and unskilled work-
ers in the period 1980-2000.41 Instead, my ﬁnding suggests that diﬀerential changes in the
geographical location of skilled and unskilled workers in this period were mostly driven by
geographical diﬀerences in the availability of new skilled and unskilled jobs.
6 Conclusions
Because of their diﬀerent geographical distribution, college graduates and high school
graduates have experienced diﬀerent increases in the cost of living over the past 30 years. One
contribution of this paper is to document that, as a consequence, the conditional diﬀerence
between the wage of college graduates and of high school graduates is signiﬁcantly lower
in real terms than in nominal terms and has grown less. In 2000, the level of the college
premium is 60% in nominal terms and only 51% in real terms. More importantly, the increase
in the college premium between 1980 and 2000 in real terms is signiﬁcantly smaller than the
increase in nominal terms. Speciﬁcally, at least 22% of the documented increase in the college
premium between 1980 and 2000 is accounted for by diﬀerences in the cost of living.
The implications of this empirical ﬁnding for disparities in well-being depend on the rea-
sons for the increase in the share of college graduates in expensive cities. Using a simple
general equilibrium model of the labor and housing markets, I consider two broad classes
of explanations. Under a demand pull hypothesis, the relative demand of college graduates
increases in expensive cities because of localized skill-biased technical change or other de-
mand shocks. In this case, college graduates move to expensive cities because the jobs for
college graduates are increasingly located in those cities, and not because they particularly
like living in those cities. The increase in their utility level is smaller than the increase
in their nominal wage due to higher cost of living. Under a supply push hypothesis, the
relative supply of college graduates increases in expensive cities because college graduates
are increasingly attracted by amenities located in those cities. The increase in the cost of
living in those cities reﬂects the attractiveness of the cities to skilled workers and is the price
for the consumption of desirable amenities. In this case, there may still be a signiﬁcant
increase in utility inequality even if the increase in real wage inequality is limited. Of course,
the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that cities experience both
demand and supply shocks.
To determine whether the variation in the relative number of college graduates across
cities is driven by relative demand or relative supply shocks, I analyze the equilibrium rela-
41This would be true, for example, if the amenities that matter for skilled and unskilled workers have
changed in a similar way within each city in this period. This would also be true if the amenities that matter
for skilled workers have changed diﬀerently from the amenities that matter for unskilled workers, but this
diﬀerential change is similar across metropolitan areas in the US.
30tionship between changes in college premium and changes in the share of college graduates
across metropolitan areas. Consistent with demand shocks playing an important role, I
ﬁnd a positive association between changes in college premium and changes in college share:
cities that experience large increases in the fraction of college graduates also experience large
increases in the relative wage of college graduates. I also present an instrumental variable
estimate obtained by instrumenting changes in college share with a measure of arguably
exogenous relative demand shocks.
The weight of the evidence seems consistent with the notion that changes in the geograph-
ical location of diﬀerent skill groups are mostly driven by changes in their relative demand.
I conclude that the increase in well-being disparities between 1980 and 2000 is smaller than
the increase in nominal wage disparities that has been the focus of the previous literature.42
This paper leaves open three important questions. First, it leaves open the question
of what ultimately causes the local relative demand shocks. In my theoretical setting, I
take these shocks as exogenous. Future research should focus on exactly what generates the
localized relative demand shifts that make college graduates more productive in some parts
of the country. Localized skill-biased technical change is a potential explanation, as long
as it is enriched by a theory of why demand shocks occur in some cities and not in others.
Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008) and Berry and Glaeser (2005) propose realistic models
and intriguing empirical evidence. Models with human capital spillovers or agglomeration
spillovers also have the potential to explain localized demand shifts (Moretti, 2004a and
2004b; Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti, 2007). An alternative explanation centers on
shifts in product demand across industries that have diﬀerent skill intensities (Buera and
Kaboski, 2009). For example, industries like ﬁnance and high tech that are skill intensive
and are located in expensive coastal metropolitan areas, have been expanding during the
1980s and 1990s. Future research should determine the role of the local industrial mix in
driving diﬀerential labor demand shifts for skilled and unskilled workers.
Second, this paper leaves open the question of how changes in housing wealth aﬀect the
relative welfare of skilled and unskilled homeowners. Consistent with the previous literature
on inequality, the main focus this paper is on diﬀerences between skilled and unskilled workers
that are caused by labor market changes. However, the broader distributional consequences
of the demand and supply shocks depend not just on changes in relative wages, but also on
changes in wealth, as discussed above. Changes in the price of housing have the potential to
aﬀect the relative wealth of diﬀerent skill groups depending on who originally owns the land
in the cities that are aﬀected by the demand and supply shocks. A full empirical treatment
of this issue is complicated and is beyond the scope of this paper.43
42My results have the potential to explain an outstanding puzzle in the inequality literature. Despite the
increase in the return to education, the rate of growth in the number of college graduates is still low relative
to earlier periods. The fact that their real wage has not increased as much as previously thought may explain
why the number of college graduates has not increased as much as one would have expected.
43Additionally, my analysis does not take into consideration features of jobs other than wages. Hamermesh
31Finally, the return to college is but one measure of wage inequality. Although it has
received much attention in the literature on inequality, future research should determine
whether the results in this paper extend to other measures of inequality.
(1999) shows that the amount of workplace disamenties (such as risk of death or workplace injury) born by
low skill workers increased more than the amount of workplace disamenties born by high skill workers during
the 1980’s. This diﬀerential change implies a larger increase in well-being inequality than the one measured
ignoring workplace disamenties, although the bias is likely to be limited for the typical workers.
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35Appendix 1
Here I describe in more details on how I compute Local CPI 1 and Local CPI 2. As
I mention in the main text, I follow closely the BLS methodology, and take the properly
weighted sum of changes in the cost of housing and non-housing consumption. Cost of
housing is measured either using rental costs or housing prices. In the ﬁrst case, my measure
of rent is the “gross monthly rental cost” of the housing unit. I limit the sample to 2 or 3
bedrooms rental units. This includes contract rent plus additional costs for utilities (water,
electricity, gas) and fuels (oil, coal, kerosene, wood, etc.). This variable is considered by
IPUMS as more comparable across households than “contract rent”, which may or may not
include utilities and fuels. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also
uses the “gross monthly rental cost” measure of rent to calculate the federally mandated
“Fair Market Rent”.44
The housing costs relevant for a worker living in metropolitan area c—whether he rents
or own—is the average of the monthly cost of renting a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment among
all renters in area c. When cost of housing is measured using housing prices, I use the
property value reported by homeowners of 2 or 3 bedroom single family houses. In this case,
the housing costs relevant for a worker living in metropolitan area c is then the average of
housing values reported by all homeowners of 2 or 3 bedroom homes in area c.
Note that measured changes in cost of housing do not reﬂect the change in rental cost
or changes in property values at the individual level. Instead, measured changes in cost of
housing reﬂect an average for the local housing market, irrespective of an individual own
housing cost and irrespective of whether she rents or owns.
As weights, in my baseline speciﬁcations I use the expenditure shares that the BLS uses
to compute the oﬃcial CPI. Since the basket is updated periodically, the BLS weights vary
by year. One concern is that housing expenditure shares may vary across metropolitan areas
because diﬀerences in housing prices. Additionally, it is possible that housing expenditure
shares vary across skill groups if preferences are non homotetic. In practice, however, the
use of BLS shares does not appear to introduce a signiﬁcant bias in my estimates of the local
CPI.
First, consider the possible diﬀerences in expenditure shares across metropolitan areas.
Since housing costs vary across cities, it is in principle possible that the share of income
spent on housing also vary, as consumers adjust their consumption bundles to local prices.
44Rents are imputed for top-coded observations by multiplying the value of the top code by 1.3. Results
do not change signiﬁcantly when no imputation is performed or when I multiply the value of the top code
by 1.4. For Local CPI 1, the cost of non-housing consumption is obtained by subtracting changes in the cost
of housing from the nationwide CPI-U computed by the BLS:
CPI Non-Housing = (CPI-U/(1 − w)) − (w/(1 − w))Housing (25)
where “Housing” is the average nationwide increase in cost of housing (from Census data) and w is the BLS
housing weight in the relevant year.
36Empirically, the demand for housing is not very price elastic and the share of income spent
on housing appears to be higher in more expensive cities. In a recent AER paper, Lewbel
and Pendakur (forthcoming) ﬁnd that a housing price increase of 10 percent results in a 0.63
percentage points higher housing share, everything else constant. If this is true, it implies
that the share of income spent on housing in expensive cities like New York is higher than
the share of income spent on housing in less expensive cities like Indianapolis, everything
else constant. Because college graduates are over-represented in expensive cities like New
York and underrepresented in less expensive cities like Indianapolis, this should increase the
housing share of college graduates relative to high-school graduates, everything else constant.
(In this case, the use of constant housing shares across cities would lead me to underestimate
the eﬀect that cost of living adjustments have on wage inequality.)
Second, consider the possibility that housing price elasticity vary by skill level (or income
level). Lewbel and Pendakur ﬁnd that high income individuals substitute less than low
income individuals in the face of an increase in the price of housing. This should further
increase the housing share of college graduates relative to high-school graduates, everything
else constant.
Third, consider the possibility of non homotetic preferences. Most empirical studies
ﬁnd that housing is a normal good, with an income elasticity just below 1 when income
is measured as permanent income.45 If this is true, the share of income spent on housing
should be slightly lower for college graduates than high-school graduates.
To account for these possibilities, I have replicated my results using diﬀerent expenditure
shares for diﬀerent cities and diﬀerent skill groups in diﬀerent years. In particular, I use
available estimates in the literature of price elasticity and income elasticity to impute shares
that vary as a function of local housing prices and individual income. For housing, I assume
a permanent income elasticity equal to .85, which is the mid-point in the range of estimates
provided by Polinsky and Ellwood (1979). I also assume that the percent diﬀerence in
permanent income between skilled and unskilled workers is 40% in 1980, 53% in 1990 and
60% in 2000. (These ﬁgures reﬂect estimates of the the nominal college premium.) To allow
for diﬀerences across cities as a function of local housing prices, I use estimates of demand
elasticity from Lewbel and Pendakur (AER forthcoming).
As I discuss in the main text, estimates of the college premium based on expenditure
shares that vary by MSA, skill group and year are similar to the ones obtained using BLS
shares that vary only by year. Overall, using a common housing share for all individuals
within a year appears not to be a bad approximation. This is consistent with what reported
by Baum-Snow and Pavan (2009), who ﬁnd that expenditures shares are generally similar
across cities of diﬀerent size (and therefore diﬀerent price level).
45For example, Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) uncover estimates of permanent income elasticity ranging
from 0.80 to 0.87.Table 1: Metropolitan Areas with the Largest and Smallest Share of College Graduates in
the Workforce
College Change in Monthly Change in
Share in College Share Rent in Monthly Rent
2000 1980-2000 2000 1980-2000
Metropolitan Areas with the Largest College Share in 2000
Stamford, CT .58 .26 1109 759
San Jose, CA .48 .15 1231 892
Washington, DC/MD/VA .48 .08 834 532
Boston, MA-NH .45 .17 854 556
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA .44 .12 1045 724
Ann Arbor, MI .43 .02 724 417
Columbia, MO .43 .06 485 239
Raleigh-Durham, NC .42 .12 669 427
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO .42 .10 693 419
Trenton, NJ .41 .14 776 494
Metropolitan Areas with the Smallest College Share in 2000
Ocala, FL .15 .02 514 285
Williamsport, PA .15 .04 434 229
Lima, OH .15 .05 444 226
Hickory-Morgantown, NC .15 .02 486 286
Johnstown, PA .14 .01 370 165
Flint, MI .14 .01 481 217
Vineland-Milville-Bridgetown, NJ .13 .01 617 368
Mansﬁeld, OH .13 .01 460 242
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA .13 .00 495 270
Danville, VA .12 .02 401 231
Notes: Share of college graduates is the share of full-time workers between 25 and 60 years
old with a college degree or more who live in the relevant city. Monthly rent refers to the




Fuels and Utilities 5.3%
Other Housing 4.6%
Transportation 17.2%
Food and Beverages 14.9%
Medical Care 6.2%
Education and Communication 6.0%
Recreation 5.5%
Apparel 3.7%
Other Goods and Services 3.5%
Notes: Entries are the share of the main aggregate components of the CPI-U. For more
disaggregated categories see Appendix 4 in Chapter 17 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s
“Handbook of Methods” (2007).Table 3: Changes in the Cost of Living, by Education Group
1980 1990 2000 Percent
Increase
1980-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬃcial CPI
High-School 1 1.53 2.02 102%
College 1 1.53 2.02 102%
Percent Diﬀerence 0 0 0
Monthly Rent
High-School 247 432 563 127%
College 259 491 642 147%
Percent Diﬀerence 4% 11% 14%
Local CPI 1
High-School 0.99 1.49 1.95 96%
College 1.01 1.58 2.07 105%
Percent Diﬀerence 2% 4% 6%
Local CPI 2
High-School 0.98 1.57 2.04 108%
College 1.01 1.71 2.22 119%
Percent Diﬀerence 3% 7% 9%
Notes: Monthly rent refers to the rent paid for a two or three bedroom apartment. Local
CPI 1 allows for local variation only in the cost of housing. Local CPI 2 allows for local
variation both in the cost of housing and the cost of non-housing goods and services.Table 4: Nominal and Real Conditional Wage Diﬀerence Between Workers with a High School Degree and Workers With College or
More, by Year - Baseline Estimates
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000 1980 1990 2000 1980-2000
Increase Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 1
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .40 .53 .60 .20 .35 .47 .53 .18
(.011) (.012) (.013) (.007) (.006) (.007)
Model 2
Real Wage Diﬀerence - Local CPI 1 .38 .48 .53 .15 .37 .46 .52 .15
(.010) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.006) (.007)
Percent of Nominal Increase 25% 17%
Accounted for by Cost of Living
Model 3
Real Wage Diﬀerence - Local CPI 2 .37 .45 .51 .14 .37 .46 .51 .14
(.009) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.006) (.007)
Percent of Nominal Increase 30% 22%
Accounted for by Cost of Living
MSA Fixed Eﬀects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the log of nominal hourly
wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, where real hourly wage is the ratio of nominal wage and Local
CPI 1. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the log of real hourly wage, where real hourly wage is the ratio of nominal wage and Local
CPI 2. All models include dummies for gender and race, a cubic in potential experience, and year eﬀects. Models in columns 5 to 8
also include MSA ﬁxed eﬀects. Sample size is 5,024,221.Table 5: Additional Speciﬁcations: Part I
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000 Percent of
Increase Nominal Increase
Accounted for
by Cost of Living
Model 1: Housing Prices Instead of Rental Costs
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .40 .53 .60 .20
(.015) (.009) (.010)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .36 .43 .50 .14 30%
(.009) (.010) (.009)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .35 .42 .50 .15 25%
(.010) (.011) (.009)
Model 2: ACCRA Non-Housing Prices
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .40 .53 .60 .20
(.015) (.009) (.010)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .38 .48 .53 .15 25%
(.008) (.006) (.007)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 (ACCRA data) .39 .48 .54 .15 25%
(.012) (.006) (.006)
Model 3: Expenditure Shares Vary By MSA and Skill Group
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .40 .53 .60 .20
(.015) (.009) (.010)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .38 .49 .53 .15 25%
(.010) (.008) (.009)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .37 .46 .51 .14 30%
(.010) (.008) (.008)
Model 4: Account for Commuting Time
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .40 .54 .60 .20
(.010) (.009) (.011)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .38 .48 .53 .15 25%
(.008) (.006) (.007)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .37 .45 .51 .14 30%
(.008) (.007) (.007)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. In the top panel I report estimates
where I deﬂate nominal wages based on local CPI’s that measure housing costs using the average price of
owner occupied houses instead of average rental costs. In the second panel, I compute Local CPI 2 using
the Accra dataset to measure local variation in non-housing prices. In the third panel, I compute the Local
CPI’s allowing for the expenditure share of housing and non-housing goods to vary by metropolitan areas
and skill level. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable is hourly wage deﬁned as the ratio of weekly or
monthly earnings over the sum of number of hours worked plus time spent commuting. See text for details.Table 6: Additional Speciﬁcations: Part II
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000 Percent of
Increase Nominal Increase
Accounted for
by Cost of Living
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 1: Include Workers with Less Than 48 Weeks
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .43 .57 .62 .19
(.009) (.010) (.012)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .42 .52 .56 .14 26%
(.008) (.007) (.008)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .41 .49 .53 .12 37%
(.007) (.007) (.007)
Model 2: Include Immigrants
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .40 .54 .61 .21
(.011) (.012) (.013)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .39 .49 .55 .16 24%
(.010) (.009) (.010)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .38 .46 .52 .14 33%
(.010) (.010) (.010)
Model 3: Only Urban Workers
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .40 .52 .60 .20
(.011) (.008) (.010)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .39 .49 .55 .16 20%
(.010) (.007) (.007)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .38 .47 .53 .15 25%
(.010) (.007) (.007)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. In the top panel,
I show estimates based on a sample that includes all wage and salary workers 25-60, irre-
spective of the number of weeks worked in the previous year. In the middle panel, I show
estimates that include workers born outside the US. In the bottom panel I drop rural workers
(i.e. those who are not assigned an MSA). See text for details.Table 7: Nominal and Real Conditional Earnings Diﬀerence Controlling for Quality of Hous-
ing, by Year - American Housing Survey
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000 Percent of
Increase Nominal Increase
Accounted for
by Cost of Living
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nominal Earnings Diﬀerence .37 .47 .56 .19
(.019) (.008) (.010)
Real Earnings Diﬀerence - Not Controlling for Quality
Real Earnings - Local CPI 1 .36 .45 .52 .16 15%
(.010) (.006) (.010)
Real Earnings - Local CPI 2 .35 .44 .51 .16 15%
(.013) (.006) (.010)
Real Earnings Diﬀerence - Controlling For Quality
Real Earnings - Local CPI 1 .35 .43 .50 .15 21%
(.012) (.007) (.012)
Real Earnings - Local CPI 2 .34 .42 .49 .15 21%
(.014) (.009) (.014)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. Data are from the
American Housing Survey. Available housing quality variables include square footage, num-
ber of rooms, number of bathrooms, indicators for the presence of a garage, a usable ﬁreplace,
a porch, a washer, a dryer, a dishwasher, outside water leaks, inside water leaks, open cracks
in walls, open cracks in ceilings, broken windows, rodents, and a broken toilet in the last 3
months. The dependent variable is log of yearly earnings (top row) or log of yearly earnings





College Share .375 .388 .371
(.031) (.070) (.106)
R2 .30 .10
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in column 1 is the city-
speciﬁc college premium, deﬁned as the city-speciﬁc diﬀerence in the log of hourly wage
for college graduates and high school graduates conditional on gender, a cubic in potential
experience, race and year. The dependent variable in columns 2 and 3 is the change in the
city-speciﬁc college premium. Entries are the coeﬃcient on college share in column 1 and
change in college share in columns 2 and 3. All models are weighted by city size.Appendix Table 1. Estimates Based on an Alternative Deﬁnition of Rental Cost
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000 Percent of
Increase Nominal Increase
Accounted for
by Cost of Living
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nominal Wage Diﬀerence .39 .53 .59 .20
(.008) (.012) (.013)
Real Wage - Local CPI 3 .32 .41 .44 .12 40%
(.006) (.005) (.004)
Real Wage - Local CPI 4 .28 .34 .38 .10 50%
(.006) (.006) (.005)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able in the ﬁrst row is the log of nominal hourly wage. The dependent variable in the second
and third row is the log of real hourly wage, where real hourly wage is the ratio of nominal
wage and Local CPI 3 or Local CPI 4. In Local CPI 3 and 4, housing costs are allowed to
vary by metropolitan area, skill group, race and number of children in the household. Local
CPI 3 only uses local variation in cost of living that arises from variation in cost of housing.
(The diﬀerence with Local CPI 1 is that in Local CPI 1 cost of housing varies only by MSA,
while in Local CPI 3 cost of housing varies by MSA, education group, race and number of
children.) Local CPI 4 uses local variation both in cost of housing and cost of non housing
good and services. (The diﬀerence with Local CPI 2 is that in Local CPI 2 cost of housing
varies only by MSA, while in Local CPI 4 cost of housing varies by MSA, education group
race and number of children.) All models include dummies for gender and race, a cubic in
potential experience, and year eﬀects. Sample size is 4,920,703.Figure 1: How Changes in the Share of College Graduates Relate to the Initial Share of




























































































































Change in Average Rent 1980−2000





Notes: Average rent is the average monthly rental price of a two or three bedroom apartment.Figure 2: The Distribution of Average Rental Costs Across Metropolitan Areas: 2000 Cross-























Change in Rent 1980−2000
 




Notes: The top panel shows the distribution of the average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom
apartment in year 2000. The bottom panel shows the distribution of the changes between
1980 and 2000 in the average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom apartment.Figure 3: How the Diﬀerence Between College and High-School Graduates Average AFQT
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1980−1990 Change in Housing Cost 
         




Notes: The top panel shows average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom apartment in 1980
(x-axis) and the diﬀerence between college graduates and high school graduates in average
AFQT scores (y-axis), across metropolitan areas. The size of the bubbles reﬂects the size of
metropolitan areas. A weighted regression yields a coeﬃcient equal to .0203 (.0274). The
bottom panel shows the 1980-1990 change in average cost of renting a 2 or a 3 bedroom
apartment (x-axis) and the 1980-1990 change in the diﬀerence between college graduates
and high school graduates in average AFQT scores (y-axis). A weighted regression yields a


























College Share in 2000
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Notes: The top panel plots estimates of the city-speciﬁc college premium in 2000 against the
share of college graduates in 2000. The bottom panel plots the 1980-2000 change in college




































Shock to Relative Demand for College Grads − 1980−2000







Notes: The panel plots changes in the share of college graduates 1980-2000 on the y-axis
against 1980-2000 shocks to the relative demand of college graduates due to 1980 diﬀerences
in industry mix on the x-axis. Shocks to the relative demand are deﬁned in equation 24.